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For the first time the Deparment of Health
and Human Services is part of the national
security apparatus of the United States. That
reflects a change in our views on chemical and
biological defense programs. Almost 5 years ago
at the bidding of the president we began to look
at what has come to be known as asymmetrical
threats, ways in which opponents (be they
nations or terrorist groups) could attack us
without directly engaging our military forces. At
the same time we were faced with two events
that drew our attention to chemical and
biological threats. Iraq used chemical weapons
on Iran and on its own citizens and appeared to
be concealing a biological weapons program.
Also, the hitherto unknown Japanese cult Aum
Shinrikyo used sarin nerve agent in the Tokyo
subway; the cult failed in an attempt to use
biological weapons against Americans in Japan.
In 1998, the president launched the first
national effort to create a biological weapons
defense for the United States. While some
believe that the response is not strong enough,
many others think that the proposed program
exaggerates the threat, that biological weapons
are too unpredictable, and that the only big
biological weapons program died with the Soviet
Union. However, the former Soviet Union was
not the only state engaged in biological weapons
research and development. Almost every nation
on the State Departments list of nations that
sponsor terrorism has engaged in chemical and
or biological weapons development. If these
nations have armed, trained, funded, and
advised terrorist groups, they could cross the line
and provide terrorists with chemical or biological
weapons. Finally, some critics say that until we
really know about a specific threat to use these
weapons against the United States, we should
not be raising the specter of horror; instead we
should be quietly working in Geneva to improve
the ban on biological weapons. We are pushing in
Geneva, but that is not enough. When we learn of
a specific threat, it will be too late to do research
and development, too late to procure medicines,
too late to train local authorities.
The current bioterrorism initiative includes
a new concept: the first-ever procurement of
specialized medicines for a national civilian
protection stockpile. As new vaccines and
medicines are developed, that program can be
expanded. The initiative includes invigoration of
research and development in the science of
biodefense; it invests in pathogen genome
sequencing, new vaccine research, new thera-
peutics research, and development of improved
detection and diagnostic systems. The 2-year
program provides for Department of Health and
Human Services research, almost tripling the
previous 2-year effort, in addition to ongoing
work in the Defense Department, and it includes
a reinitiation of the federal program to help state
and local public health infrastructure and
surveillance systems.
The biological weapons protection program is
part of the overall chemical and biological
protection effort, which includes aid to state and
local governments for first-responder training,
planning, exercises, and equipment.
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